Introduction
In most countries, particularly in East Asia, ownership is concentrated within founding families (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) . According to Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) , weakness caused by separation of ownership and management, as well as the prevalence of family firms, is evidence of financial underdevelopment, whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that family control has a positive impact on value because family firms typically have longer planning horizons that result in valuable investment strategies. We consider family firms to be effective organizational structures because they perform better than nonfamily firms.
Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability provide the necessary incentives for CEOs to make decisions according to market rules (James, 1999) . Moreover, a founder who plans to pass his or her business to an heir will be more likely to use firm resources efficiently than a founder who does not plan on transferring the business to a family member. If families have advantages in disciplining and monitoring CEOs, the question of whether family presence mitigates the effectiveness of corporate governance becomes an interesting issue.
In East Asia, more than 50% of the businesses are family-controlled and many Asian family firms are owned and operated by Chinese (Tan & Fock, 2001 ). The aggressive nature of entrepreneurship and strong cohesiveness of families are key factors in Chinese family businesses (Yen, 1994) . Zapalska and Edwards (2001) also found that there are significant links between Chinese culture and entrepreneurial activities in China. There are, however, significant differences between the Chinese and Western culture as regards business activity (Begley & Tan, 2001; Gatfield & Youseff, 2001; Pistrui, Huang, Oksoy, Jing, & Welsch, 2001) .
Many aspects of Chinese culture, influenced by Confucianism, combine to promote collectivism and traditional respect for age, hierarchy, and authority in the Asian business environment (Zapalska & Edwards, 2001) . Confucian culture emphasizes the values of paternalism and collectivism, both of which contribute to Asian business relations. More importantly, Chinese culture advocates conformity rather than individuality (Begley & Tan, 2001 ) and this is important in shaping managerial style (Hugh, 1986) . The centralization of decision making is acceptable in such a cultural context. Moreover, Chinese have a strong commitment to family, and thus business is perceived as an extension of the family system (Zapalska & Edwards, 2001) .
Taiwanese family CEOs' sense of professionalism and family loyalty is derived from the enterprise system and the family system, which coalesce in family firms (Yen, 1996) . Informal family influence is more powerful than formal authority in family firms because CEOs and top management are also family members (Yen, 1996) . The family system is designed to increase family welfare and status and preserve them for future family members. The family mentality of local entrepreneurs is a key motivator in the growth stage of an organization, but it may also obstruct the development of family firms (Yen, 1994) . Recently, Chinese corporate culture has been experiencing dramatic changes. Lee and Chan (1998) found that the second generation of Singaporean entrepreneurs is quite different from their parents because they have absorbed many values of Western culture. Moreover, the division of family properties is, as a rule, rigid in Chinese culture, though it is also a factor in business diversification (Yen, 1994) .
Some preliminary studies of the performance of family firms and key strategy decisions, such as CEO compensation, have been done (Sharma, 2004) . However, there are few papers dealing with the sensitivity of firm performance to CEO turnover and the impact of ownership structure on CEO tenure in family firms. Despite a great deal of theoretical speculation, few empirical investigations of CEO tenure in Asian countries have been conducted. Most companies with ultimate owners in Taiwan are characterized as family controlled and have highly concentrated ownership structures (Y. H. Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke, 2001) . Taiwan is clearly an ideal setting to examine the net effects, benefits, and costs in the arrangement of CEO succession under different ownership structures. This investigation tests the effectiveness of corporate governance by investigating the link between CEO turnover and corporate governance of family and nonfamily firms in Taiwan.
We divide samples into family firms and nonfamily firms and investigate the differences in the relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance of these two groups. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. However, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly negative in both family and nonfamily firms. When family CEOs perform poorly, they are more likely to be dismissed than are nonfamily CEOs. Our study found that the majority of family CEOs are forced to step down due to poor performance. Their successors remain family members, such as founders' brothers or sons. In one case, the founder became the CEO again. Hence, poorly performing CEOs are more likely to be replaced, suggesting that more stringent monitoring mechanisms exist in family firms. This study also considered internal competition among family members as a possible explanation for CEO turnover. Shen and Cannella (2002a) suggested that the factors influencing CEO dismissal followed by contender succession significantly differ from those influencing CEO dismissal followed by follower succession. K. S. Yeh and Tsao (1996) used network analysis to examine the power exchange and ownership succession process in Taiwanese family firms and argued that ownership succession is regarded as power-gaining strategy since the successor is able to change the distribution of power in a firm. To assure the stability and survival of family firms, an appropriate succession strategy should eliminate conflict among family members (K. S. Yeh & Tsao, 1996) . This study also found that family CEOs could still enlarge their tenures and that a family board may still effectively replace a poorly performing Tsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo CEO despite relatively low ownership. It is interesting that the agency theory is unsuitable for Taiwanese family firms because ownership structures are not related to CEO tenures. Involvement in the corporate governance system depends on organizational structure. Directors of boards in family firms may mitigate rather than exacerbate agency problems.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Corporate Governance in Taiwan
The American common-law tradition exhibits relatively high ownership dispersion in U.S. nonfamily firms, as is the case in other countries (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1999) . In addition, U.S. firms may not face severe agency problems due to strong investor protection. Both Japan and Germany have adopted civil law, but their corporate governance depends on the relationship between firms and key banks (Claessens et al., 2002; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995) . However, most firms in other countries are predominantly family controlled (La Porta et al., 1999) and, consequently, the effects of large shareholders are difficult to detect in developed market data (Claessens et al., 2002) .
After the East Asian financial crisis, numerous investors have been demanding corporate governance reforms in emerging markets (Gibson, 2003; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000) . Taiwan is an ideal setting to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance owing to its weak legal protection for shareholders, defective law enforcement, high ownership concentration, and an abundance of family firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Lemmon & Lins, 2003) . In 2000, Taiwanese firms had fewer liabilities than other Asian economies, and institutional investors held under 20% of the stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. In Taiwan, M&A are rare to begin with (Claessens et al., 2002) , so the controlling shareholders have less fear of losing control from takeovers (La Porta et al., 1999) . The monitoring function of boards of directors is much more significant because of the missing external markets for corporate control.
Various control arrangements, such as differential voting rights, cross-holdings, pyramids, and so forth, result in many Taiwanese firms that have ultimate owners with significant controlling rights (Claessens et al., 2002) . Seen from the perspective of corporate law, the board structures in Taiwan can be viewed as modified dual structures. Although directors and supervisors are elected from among the shareholders in separate elections, the qualifications and independence of directors are inadequate. Unlike the in the United States, the election of independent directors to the boards and the various board committees (audit, nomination, remuneration committees, etc.) is not required under the current corporation law or securities exchange law in Taiwan. Also, the minority stockholders still have difficulties entering boards even though cumulative voting for the election of board members is permitted. In Taiwan, legal entities, such as government entities and corporations, often serve as directors and supervisors of firms. Split-loyalty problems (Liu, 2001) and complex ownership structures arise as a result.
Ownership concentration reveals the fact that Taiwanese listed companies are still largely family owned. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) discovered that in more than two-thirds of firms with concentrated ownership, managers come from controlling families. Claessens et al. (2002) also examined the ownership structure of firms in nine East Asian countries and found that the family is the largest blockholder in nearly 70% of their sample.Y. H. Yeh et al. (2001) found that Taiwanese controlling shareholders are able to effectively control their firms by making extensive use of mechanisms that separate their control rights from their cash-flow rights. Especially in family firms, the control is often enhanced beyond ownership stakes through pyramid schemes and cross-holdings among corporations (Claessens et al., 2002) . Insiders and affiliated outsiders dominate the boards because the family uses its shares to vote collectively. Frequently, family CEOs (usually the founders of the firms or their descen-dants), are often, simultaneously, chairmen of the boards; thus large controlling shareholders are actively involved in company management. Most family firms are operated not by professional managers without equity ownership, but by family owners (La Porta et al., 1999) . Family managers also have various methods to transfer corporate assets to their family members (Claessens et al., 2002) . In fact, management in family firms is usually the controlling shareholder, which makes the transfer of wealth easier.
In sum, two opposite effects exist in family firms: on the one hand, family firms preserve sufficiently high ownership concentration to help solve the managerial agency problem because controlling shareholders have incentives and the power to discipline CEOs; on the other hand, they also create the conditions for new agency problems because the interests of controlling shareholders and managers are still not perfectly aligned. Generally, managers of Taiwanese corporations are usually related to the family of the controlling shareholder (Y. H. Yeh et al., 2001) . Thus, it is advantageous to analyze the relative importance of incentive and entrenchment effects in Taiwanese corporations because ownership is so highly concentrated while the conflicts between managers and owners are generally limited. Theoretically, there are two strategies to assess the effectiveness of the monitoring function of the board. The first is to evaluate the firm performance in relation to similar companies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998) . The second is to investigate the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance (Gibson, 2003; Lin, Chu, & Hung, 2003) . The reasons to dismiss CEOs could be that the value of a company has diminished due to poor management and/or ownership structure.
This study tested whether corporate governance is ineffective in Taiwanese listed firms by examining the link between CEO turnover and firm performance. We understand that such a link is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for effective corporate governance. CEO replacement policy is generally regarded as a key monitoring mechanism because of weak legal protection of minority shareholders, underdeveloped financial markets, and the limited monitoring role of banks.
CEO replacement policy is a type of monitoring mechanism that companies use to reduce agency problems. However, the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , which takes into account selfinterest, conflict of interests and goals, as well as asymmetric information, is unsuitable for investigating the operations of family firms. The stewardship theory can be used as an alternative model of managerial motivation and behavior because the propositions of agency theory may not apply to all organizations. Generally, low power distance results in principal-steward relationships (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) .
Managers may obtain greater utility by pursuing organizational rather than personal goals. Similarly, the managerial philosophy of family CEOs is based on active involvement and trust while the culture of the family firm is based on collectivism. Family firms have various unique characteristics compared to nonfamily firms. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001) argued that family firms need not incur significant agency costs. It is useful to review the presumptions of agency problems listed above (i.e., self-interest, conflict of interests and goals, and information asymmetry) and explore whether these exist in family firms, for example, the limits of agency theory in exploring the control of owners' opportunistic behavior, which may, ironically, be rooted in an altruistic impulse. Altruism, commitment, and loyalty to the family are fostered by the collective family structure. This alignment reduces the incentive to be individually opportunistic (Fama & Jensen, 1985) . However, Schulze et al. (2001) postulated that altruism alters the incentive structure of family firms to the extent that many of the agency benefits gained are offset by problems of self-control and moral hazard. Altruism, therefore, adds the problem of self-control to the agency theory: it may bias family perceptions because family agents have the Tsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo incentive to opt for the free ride. But the decision to replace a CEO should improve firm performance by controlling the family agents' tendency to take this option (Chami, 1999) .
Special Characteristics of Family Firms
Also, family CEOs should alleviate agency costs because of natural alignments of interests. Families should mitigate agency costs because corporate ownership is largely held by family members whose involvement assures that a CEO will not expropriate shareholder wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1985) . Furthermore, the appointment of a CEO should not affect family-firm performance because his or her interests are already aligned with those of the owners.
Agency relationships create information asymmetries that may ultimately harm the welfare of owners and pose a moral hazard to agents. Owners can reduce these dangers by monitoring agent behavior and by providing incentives that encourage agents to act in the owners' best interests. In family firms, information is gathered and shared through the communication channels among members whose special relationships to one another allow agency problems to be controlled without separation of management and control decisions. So, family management should further decrease agency costs. Likewise, the cost of reducing information asymmetries and the accompanying moral hazard is low in family firms.
More generally, family control does have a positive impact on value and efficiency. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggested that family ownership is an effective organizational structure and that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Indeed, Daily and Dollinger (1992) argued that family firms represent one of the least costly forms of organizational governance. Jensen and Mecking (1976) also posited that formal monitoring mechanisms in family firms are not necessary and their expense may harm corporate performance; this is consistent with Fama and Jensen's assertion that family relationships provide improved monitoring.
Traditions, loyalty, bonding relationships, and altruism determine how resources are used to enhance the value of family firms. The disparate effects of agency costs on firm value are not naturally present in the family firm. In fact, firm value can be increased to the extent that families are stabilized by transferring business assets to the next generation of family managers. Our study considered the possibility that family firms where ownership and control functions are combined are more efficient.
Three Effects on CEO Tenure and Testable Hypotheses
Successful governance mechanisms penalize CEOs of firms with poor corporate performance; therefore, investigating CEO turnover and the sensitivity of turnover to performance is a way to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, the reason that CEO replacement rules may vary under different organizational structures is that optimization problems depend on the relationship between corporate profit and personal utility maximization. Indeed, other factors (below) may play a dominant role in CEO tenure, suggesting that the CEO replacement decisions of family firms will differ from those of nonfamily firms.
The turnover-performance relation. According to agency theory, outcome-oriented contracts are relatively effective in reducing principal-agent conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The stronger the association between CEO tenure and corporate performance, the higher the expected firm value. In nonfamily firms, many authors have hypothesized that boards of directors are more likely to dismiss CEOs with poor performance and less likely to replace those with good performance (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988) .
However, family ties and traditions seem to enhance cooperation among family managers, thus affecting the performance of the business and further influencing CEO tenure. Anticipating the transfer of the business to a family member, current managers may be more likely than nonfamily managers with a long-term interest to improve firm performance. But not all managers of family firms make efficient CEO replacement decisions, especially when they plan on transferring the business to family members. To mitigate agency threats to firm performance, most family firms offer pay incentives and use other formal monitoring mechanisms (Schulze et al., 2001) rather than CEO replacement. The tenures of family CEOs can be extended because the interpersonal relationships among family members tie the family together. Based on a behavior-oriented contract, we expect that CEO turnovers are low and even irrelevant to performance in family firms.
Hypothesis 1. CEO turnovers are negatively related to the performance of nonfamily firms, but not related to the performance of family firms.
Turnover, performance, and the effects of CEO ownership. High CEO ownership is likely to increase CEO control power (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishney, 1988) ; therefore, it can also make it difficult to remove a poorly performing CEO. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) found that the probability of CEO turnover is negatively correlated with the ownership stake held by a top executive. Therefore, it is possible that the CEO was entrenched against the interests of the other stockholders in order to preserve his or her position out of motives of self-interest.
Family firms are significantly different from nonfamily firms owing to the intimate relationship between CEOs and family members. These firms provide for the basic economic and social needs of family members by selecting and distributing consumption bundles to all members of the family (Stephens, 1963) , including the CEO. A sense of mutual circumstance fosters feelings of altruism and loyalty implicit in the family relationship that affects the CEO's decisions, which are, generally, geared toward the interests of the family. Therefore, they may be less inclined to pursue personal interests over family needs. As a result, an insignificant position entrenchment effect exists in family firms due to altruism. Furthermore, family members may not be willing to disagree with a firm CEO in order to avoid offending other family members or causing family conflicts. The family CEO has a little selfish interest in the family business because the perceptions of co-ownership are fostered among the family members. This may induce CEOs to lengthen their tenures despite low ownership. This is because the extended tenures of family CEOs maintain the continuity of the family business even when CEOs hold few shares. Our expectations are that CEO turnovers are irrelevant to the CEO ownership of family firms.
Hypothesis 2. CEO turnovers are negatively related to CEO ownership of nonfamily firms, but irrelevant to the CEO ownership of family firms.
The role of the board of directors. The role of the board of directors in corporate governance is, essentially, to monitor CEO performance and replace poorly performing CEOs. The monitoring ability of the board of directors is related to director ownership; greater ownership by directors may reduce management entrenchment and help replace poorly performing CEOs as well as mitigate agency costs.
However, if the interests of agents and principals are not in conflict, there is no agency problem. No agency cost occurs, so there is no need for monitoring mechanisms. The research done by Daily and Dollinger (1992) and Geeraerts (1984) shows that family firms are less likely to use formal monitoring mechanisms than other firms because informal systems grounded in strong personal relationships serve as governance mechanisms. Family owner-managers tend to be reluctant in committing to jointly determined actions that limit their decision-making power. Also, the close-knit relationship between family members alleviates information asymmetry while making the monitoring of CEOs more effective (Pollak, 1985) . Another advantage of families as a monitoring mechanism is the ability to align interests of family managers across generations so they have an incentive for maximizing firm value (James, 1999) . In contrast, nonfamily firms, because of managerial rewards tied to firm perTsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo formance, increase monitoring, which motivates CEOs to implement successful strategic decisions. Nonfamily firms need vigilant boards of directors whose ability to monitor and discipline the CEO is not compromised by the CEO's power. Nonfamily firms reduce CEO entrenchment and increase board autonomy and vigilance with rules concerning CEO tenure and appointment that mitigate agency costs.
Hypothesis 3. Higher board ownership can reduce the entrenchment effect in nonfamily firms, whereas board ownership structure has no relevance to CEO tenure in family firms.
Sample, Data, and Method
Sample
This study used data on Taiwanese firms from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Database, which provides financial information on publicly traded firms in Taiwan. The subject data set contains all the firm-year observations for which TEJ data on CEO turnover and firm performance are available. The sample covered the period 1998 to 2002. Owing to the Asian financial crisis (1997) (1998) , the sample begins in 1998. We examined a total of 304 firms.
We subdivided samples into two groups: family and nonfamily firms. A family firm is defined as a privately held company that will be inherited and controlled by one or more of the proprietor's children upon his or her retirement (James, 1999) . Burkart et al. (2003) argued that the arrangements of family succession include the shares retained and participation on the board. Using ownership, management, and control structures, Villalonga and Amit (2004) defined nine different types of family firms. In most family firms, ownership and control are aligned. Considering the control right of board seats, boards of directors dominated by family members have power to decide CEO tenures. Family firms are strictly defined as public corporations whose CEOs are either the founders or members of the founder's family and where more than half the board seats are occupied by family members. Our study used the relatively strict definition of family firms due to limitations of sample information.
Definitions of Variables
CEO tenure serves as a dependent variable for estimating the survival model. This study set the start date for measuring the tenure of CEOs as January 1, 1998. For example, when a firm replaced the CEO on December 25, 2000, the CEO tenure was 35.81 months (2.98 years). The related variables (measured in the year preceding turnover) include:
1. Stock Return: stock return between the turnover year and the year preceding turnover.
2. CEO Ownership: proportion of shares held by CEOs to total shares outstanding. 3. Board Ownership: percentage of shares held by board of directors to total shares outstanding.
4. Combined Leadership: 1 if CEO is also the chairman, 0 otherwise.
5. Industry Dummy: 1 for electronic firms, 0 otherwise.
6. Sales Growth: ratio of net sales at the turnover year over net sales at the year preceding turnover minus one.
7. Financial Leverage: debt-to-asset ratio. 8. Firm Size: logarithm of market value of the firm's common shares outstanding.
9. Firm Risk: the systematic risk obtained from the capital asset pricing model. 10. Growth Opportunity: ratio of market value of the firm over book value of total assets.
Empirical Model
Recent studies have suggested that survival analysis has several advantages over previous research methodologies, such as logistic regression and discriminant analysis (Cox & Oakes, 1984) . For example, survival analysis can incorporate more time series variation into parameter estimates (Shen & Cannella, 2002b) ; also, survival analysis can resolve sample selection problems resulting from censoring (Allison, 1995) . Executive departures are particularly rare events (Furtado & Karan, 1990 ). An important feature of survival analysis is the presence of "censored observations," the exact survival time of which is not known, although it is known to exceed some specific length. The censored observations (i.e., CEOs unchanged) should be considered in estimating the survival model to avoid sampling bias (Shen & Cannella, 2002b) . Time-varying covariates that influence CEO tenure also throw light on the process of CEO replacement and can assist external investors in taking timely and effective enforcement actions regarding firms with poor corporate governance.
This study used survival analysis to establish a model of CEO tenure to estimate the hazard rate of CEO turnover and determine whether the tenures of family CEOs differ from those of nonfamily CEOs. First, let T denote the CEO tenure. Since T is a random variable, the instantaneous risk of CEO turnover at time t can be defined as a density function f(t):
The probability of a CEO surviving longer than time t is a cumulative density function measured from t to infinity:
where S(t) is known as the survival function. The hazard rate, h(t), measures the conditional probability of CEO turnover at an instant following time t for a CEO remaining longer than time t:
CEO tenure depends on corporate performance, ownership structure, and corporate governance efficiency. This investigation transforms these characteristics into estimates of CEO turnover risk. Given a vector of proxy variables for these j determinatives, x j , the CEO turnover hazard function can be expressed as h(t/x j ). If x j is linked to h(t/x j ) via the function g(x j ), then h(t/x j ) can be stated as:
where h(t/0), known as a baseline hazard function, denotes the hazard function for an individual under the standard conditions, x j = 0.
Equation (4) suggests that factors (x j ) have a proportional influence on CEO survival time; or, the hazard function changes from the baseline hazard by a ratio of g(x j ). A regression model based on Equation (4) thus is considered a "proportional hazard (PH) regression." When the PH model is adopted, researchers frequently assume that g(x j ) takes this form: (5) Vector β demonstrates the effects of proxy variables x j on CEO tenure. This work also assumes that g(x j ) takes other forms and adopts alternative distributions to create the survival model.
This investigation builds the Cox proportional hazard models (PH model) as follows: (6) where i and t represent firm and time, respectively, h(t/x j,t−1,i ) is the CEO turnover hazard rate, and h(t/0) denotes the baseline hazard rate.
Empirical Results
In Table 1 , only a small fraction are family firms; according to the estimate, approximately 20.72% of the sample is family controlled. Family firms make up between 40% and 80% of all sample firms in the cement, food, and glass industries, but only 10.20% of all sample firms are family owned in the electronics industry. This fact suggests that there is a predominance of specialized ownership in the high-tech industry.
CEO turnover in Asia continues to rise, and it is accelerating faster than in other regions. Table 1 reports that the average turnover is 34.54% between 1998 and 2002. Moreover, Table 1 shows that family CEO turnover differ from nonfamily CEO turnover in research done on 304 firms. Thirteen family firms experienced CEO turnover (i.e., event) compared with 92 nonfamily firms that experienced CEO turnover. For each industry, the fraction of CEOs replaced is computed. The average turnover shows that turnover is
Tsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo significantly lower for family CEOs (20.63%) than for nonfamily CEOs (38.17%). Table 2 presents a comparison of family firms and nonfamily firms. As expected, family CEOs have longer tenures than CEOs in nonfamily companies. There is at least some evidence indicating that the lengthening of the family CEO's tenure has the potential to overcome many difficulties faced by family firms in which ownership and control are combined. Findings also show that stability of the agency relationship in family firms (in this case, embodied by the CEO) contributes to the alignment of interests between the principals and the agents. A second comparison in Table 2 also illustrates that family firms have lower stock returns than nonfamily firms, in spite of insignificant mean differences in the event sample. This is a marked performance disadvantage for family firms. Moreover, in the censored subgroup, the differences in CEO ownership between family and nonfamily firms are statistically significant at levels lower than 0.05. Nonfamily firms have higher CEO ownership than do family firms; but family firms have considerably lower board ownership compared to nonfamily firms in the subgroup of CEO changed firms. On average, 24.0% of CEOs are also chairmen of boards in nonfamily firms, but only 7.7% of CEOs are chairmen in family firms. In the subgroup of CEO unchanged firms, the mean of the CEO title dummy is relatively high in family firms. Note: The sample covered the period 1998 to 2002. This study subdivided samples into two groups: family and nonfamily firms. In this study, family firms are defined to be public corporations whose CEOs are either founders or members of the founder's family, where more than half the board seats are occupied by family members. CEO turnover is identified if the CEO is replaced between t and t − 1. Sample size covers 304 firms.
try effect exists. In the subgroup of CEO unchanged firms, sales growth and growth opportunity are lower in family firms. Likewise, the market values of family firms are considerably smaller in spite of the fact that they use more financial leverage than nonfamily firms. Finally, the results of Cox proportional hazard regressions are presented in Panel A of Table 3 . Notably, the sensitivity of turnover to market performance is significantly higher for family CEOs than for nonfamily CEOs. In Models 1 and 3, a realization of the stock return equal to a 1% decline causes the probability of turnover to increase by 3.44% (equal to the exponent of −0.035 minus 1) for a family CEO but only by 1.88% for a nonfamily one. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by our research. The results suggest that when firm performance is poor, both family and nonfamily CEOs are likely to be replaced but the probability is higher for family CEOs; therefore, Tsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo 0*** *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Note: CEO tenure serves as the dependent variable for estimating the survival model. The independent variables are measured in the year preceding turnover. Stock return: stock return between the turnover year and the year preceding turnover; CEO ownership: proportion of shares held by CEOs to total shares outstanding; Board ownership: percentage of shares held by board of directors to total shares outstanding; Combined leadership: 1 if CEO is also the chairman, 0 otherwise; Industry dummy: 1 for electronic firms, 0 otherwise; Sales growth: ratio of net sales at the turnover year over net sales at the year preceding turnover minus one; Financial leverage: debt-toasset ratio; Firm size: logarithm of market value of the firm's common shares outstanding; Firm risk: the systematic risk obtained from the capital asset pricing model; Growth opportunity: ratio of market value of the firm over book value of total assets.
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family CEOs are not entrenched. Contrary to the expectation that CEO turnovers are not related to performance of family firms, we find family firms have a significantly positive impact on CEO tenures.
In Model 3, a 1% increase in CEO ownership implies a 3.25% decrease in the probability of turnover for a nonfamily CEO. The coefficient on CEO ownership is insignificant in family firms, suggesting that the probability of a family CEO losing his or her job is not related to CEO ownership. This result is consistent with the view of McConaughy et al. (1998) , which explains that the owner-managers appear to be much more important than the level of managerial ownership. As hypothesized, the coefficient on board ownership is significantly positive in nonfamily firms, indicating that high board ownership is associated 21 CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective with increased CEO turnover; yet the coefficient on board ownership is insignificant in family firms. The reason for this is that family firms can also perform control functions through concentrated voting rights and are simultaneously actively involved in management; so, there are family members who are stockholders and simultaneously carry out management responsibilities despite low board ownership. We also examined the robustness of the main findings for different performance indicators, such as ROA, EPS, EVA, and return of operating cash flow; the results are not sensitive to these definitions of corporate performance (see Table  3 ). Replacing corporate performance in the year preceding CEO turnover with the five-year average performance indicator, the results are almost identical to those reported by this study. We identified the reason a CEO leaves a firm and reran the Cox regressions of the sample of forced turnovers; the results remain unchanged. We also used other analysis methods, including accelerated failure time models and logistic regressions; the results remain unchanged. These results are not presented so as to conserve space. Our study also considered interaction effects and added two important interaction variables into Cox PH models (see Panel A of Table 4 ). The estimated coefficient on the interaction term of Firm Size and Sales Growth is negative in nonfamily firms. A possible explanation is that professional CEOs with competence may entrench their positions during the period of rapid expansion in nonfamily firm. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term of Firm Size and Sales Growth is significantly positive in family firms, suggesting that family CEO turnovers increase with expanding firm value and sales scale. Many family CEOs were replaced by professional CEOs because family CEOs failed to meet the challenges of rapid growth. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term of Stock Return and CEO Ownership is significantly negative in nonfamily firms, suggesting that turnover decreases with high ownership and performance yet is positively associated with family CEO turnovers. We further investigated these observations and found that most CEO successors were family members in family firms. The evidence implies that internal competition among family members may be the main factor in CEO change. Shen and Cannella (2002b) suggested that inside CEO successions are frequently the result of a power contest within top management. Shen (2003) also explored the evolution of CEO leadership and suggested that power may influence CEO behavior-but their significance changes over the period of CEO tenure. New CEOs need time to establish their authority and develop leadership, so senior executives have an opportunity to challenge them in the early years of their tenures. Shen (2003) claimed that boards of directors should focus on CEO leadership development early in a CEO's tenure because new CEOs have strong incentives to develop their leadership capacity; however, boards of directors should place emphasis on the control of managerial opportunism late in CEO tenures because CEO power increases over time. Once CEOs have successfully established their authority, they are less likely to face a risk of power contests. Shen and Cannella (2002b) reported that CEOs experience high dismissal risk during the early years of their tenures but become entrenched in their positions as the years of their tenures accumulate. According to Shen and Cannella (2002b) , the early years of CEO tenures were measured as a dummy variable. Gabarro (1987) suggested that the process of CEOs establishing authority in the office generally takes from 30 to 48 months; thus, our study selected 2.5 years of tenure as the cut-off point. Early years of tenure were coded 1 for the first 2.5 years of CEO tenure and 0 otherwise. Early CEO tenure displays a positive impact on both family and nonfamily firm CEO turnovers (see Panel B of Table 4 ). Our result shows that CEOs are in weak positions and are at high risk due to power contests in the early years of their tenures. The result of our study is consistent with those of Ocasio (1994) and Shen and Cannella (2002b) . The dynamics of the CEOboard relationship influence CEO turnovers but most agency theorists focus exclusively on the control of managerial opportunism and neglect managerial competence (Shen, 2003) .
Tsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo Discussion McConaughy (2000) found the tenure length of family CEOs to be almost three times that of nonfamily CEOs (17.6 years vs. 6.4 years). This study confirmed that the turnover of family CEOs is about half that of nonfamily CEOs (20.63% vs. 000]*** *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Note: The dependent variable is the hazard rate of CEO turnover. The independent variables are measured in the year preceding turnover. Stock return: stock return between the turnover year and the year preceding turnover; CEO ownership: proportion of shares held by CEOs to total shares outstanding; Board ownership: percentage of shares held by board of directors to total shares outstanding; CEO tenure dummy: 1 for the first 2.5 years of CEO tenure, 0 otherwise; Combined leadership: 1 if CEO is also the chairman, 0 otherwise; Industry dummy: 1 for electronic firms, 0 otherwise; Sales growth: ratio of net sales at the turnover year over net sales at the year preceding turnover minus one; Financial leverage: debt-to-asset ratio; Firm size: logarithm of market value of the firm's common shares outstanding; Firm risk: the systematic risk obtained from the capital asset pricing model; Growth opportunity: ratio of market value of the firm over book value of total assets. Kintana, & Makri, 2003; McConaughy, 2000) . The results show that the turnovers of family CEOs are lower than those of nonfamily CEOs due to family control. Conversely, nonfamily CEOs face higher cognitive costs and psychological barriers when leaving their jobs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) . We did not exclude the possibility that the corporate governance in Taiwanese family firms could be inefficient. The empirical results indicated that board monitoring does not improve CEO decision making in family firms with low board ownership. Consequently, family firms need to refine relatively formal governance mechanisms in addition to maintaining family cohesion. Poor corporate performance in family firms is the critical factor regardless of whether governance is operating efficiently or not. Owing to the differences in governance systems of family and nonfamily firms, it seems family CEOs are more likely to enhance corporate value. Several studies argue that firms whose ownership and control are aligned achieve better corporate performance than those with ownership and control separation (Daily & Dollinger, 1992) . Anderson and Reeb (2003) also found that firm performance increases until a family has about a third of the ownership; past this, performance tends to decrease. Other authors find that firm value significantly decreases when members of the founding family occupy more than half the board seats. As there are considerable ideological differences behind the performance of family and nonfamily firms that have been presented, it is necessary to explore the effectiveness of these two organizational structures. Cohesive forces, such as family ties, relatively illiquid ownership, and the extent of family members' involvement, can make a difference to the success of a family business, but the same factors can also lead to the failure of a family business if development is unsatisfactory. Shen (2003) suggested that boards need to focus on CEO leadership development early on in CEO tenure but enhance the control of managerial opportunism later on because long tenure diminishes performance. Unfortunately, our research did not explore the key successful strategic decision-making factors of family firms. Furthermore, because our results lacked evidence to support good performance in family firms, the low turnover of family CEOs may be considered a symptom of poor monitoring.
Although corporate governance of family firms may be different from that of nonfamily firms and it is recognized that family firms have a significant economic influence, empirical research into the governance mechanisms of family firms is scarce. Governance of family firms should be grounded in unique family characteristics such as ownership structure and control mechanisms.
The effects of ownership distribution and control systems have been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. According to the new theory of property rights, Gubitta and Gianecchini (2002) offered a definition of flexibility in the corporate governance of family firms. Mustakallio, Autio, and Zahra (2002) also provided a family business governance model, addressing social capital effects on strategic decision making. Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003) argued that various corporate governance theories will have differential applicability to board composition across the stages of the organizational life cycle and depend on the relative power of the CEO. Our study relied on a sound theoretical framework to analyze the operations of family firms. Agency theory focuses on the conflict of interests between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and designs a monitoring mechanism that avoids opportunistic behavior resulting in reduced performance. Stewardship theory argues that a manager's goal is to maximize the wealth of stockholders and appeals to the authority and trust among board members (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) . The two perspectives assign radically different roles to the board of directors. Although agency theory has been criticized for ignoring the effects of close interactions among family members (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996) , these family relationships may allow a firm to build informal governance mechanisms that complement formal systems emphasized by agency theorists. In family firms, governance becomes a compromise between the family interest and business value. This unique ownership structure enables family firms to maintain two governance systems that combine both contractual and relaTsai, Hung, Kuo, Kuo tional aspects. Although a reassessment of agency theory in the domain of family firms has revealed the limited scope of accepted theory (Sharma, 2004) , an empirical study of the unique governance mechanisms in family firms on CEO replacement is still lacking.
Theoretically, agency problems arise when the relationship between principals and agents are characterized by divergent interests, asymmetric information, and bounded rationality. Separation of ownership and management provides an opportunity for managers to act in their own selfinterest at the cost of the owners; however, we should not neglect the importance of altruism in the combination of ownership and management in family firms. Both the active involvement in business management and the intimate relationship of family members weaken agency costs between managers and owners due to low information asymmetry in family firms. Agency theory is not applicable to family firms because self-interest and information asymmetry are not factors.
It is likely that the assumption of low agency costs in family firms depends on the nature of family ties. However, the entrenchment effect of family control can create other agency problems for stockholders. Our study discovered negative entrenchment effects on nonfamily CEOs and showed that agency problems caused by entrenchment in family firms may be more severe than those in nonfamily firms. Indeed, the results for family CEO tenures reveal that family CEOs with longer tenures hold lower ownership. We feel that there is a need for future research: definitions of CEO entrenchment and board monitoring ability through ownership structure must be reassessed. Yet it is difficult to establish direct links between ownership structures, monitoring, and entrenchment effects. Although previous studies support the hypothesis that high CEO ownership partially insulates a CEO from the disciplinary influence of internal monitoring systems, high CEO ownership does not necessarily result in entrenchment. There is the argument that the effects of monitoring may be strongest when ownership and control coincide. Family firms with low board ownership do not necessarily entail a loss of governance efficiency. According to Villalonga and Amit (2004) , focusing on ownership concentration emphasizes agency costs between majority and minority stockholders but may oversimplify the complexity of agency problems between managers and stockholders. Agency costs between minority shareholders and controlling stockholders occur if a family member serves as a CEO; conversely, hiring professional CEOs causes agency problems between managers and controlling stockholders. Agency problems occur due to the separation of ownership and management; both family and nonfamily CEOs experience agency costs unless there is 100% family ownership. One challenge for future research is to identify the factors that influence agency costs.
Finally (and despite the fact that family CEOs have sufficient incentives to place family welfare ahead of personal interests), why is the likelihood of CEO turnover sensitive to performance in family firms? Logically, the roles of family members should dominate the continuity and development of family firms-given that board members have a closer involvement in making relevant decisions. On the one hand, the desire to transfer a family business to the next generation acts as an incentive for family managers to consider long-term strategies for their family's welfare. The reason being is that the emotional bonds characteristic of families may lead to altruistic actions that overrule personal considerations, resulting in relatively more efficient managerial replacement decisions. On the other hand, economic rationality of co-ownership considered by other family members may influence decisions concerning CEO appointment. Yet there is still the moral hazard problem in family firms, which implies that it is necessary to formalize a contract or develop an optimal monitoring system (e.g., CEO replacement rules, etc.) even though conflicts of interest in the agency relationship can be mitigated in the long term. In general, the family situation acts not only as an effective governance mechanism but also as a coherent organizing structure in which optimization decisions are made with the entire family and future family members in mind (James, 1999) . The link between CEO turnover and firm performance for family firms should not differ radically from nonfamily firms. This study even found that the sensitivity of turnover to corporate performance was significantly higher for family CEOs than for nonfamily CEOs.
Conclusion
We examined the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 Taiwanese listed companies. Thirteen CEOs were replaced in 63 family firms and 92 CEOs were dismissed in 241 nonfamily firms. We presented evidence that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms but its relationship to corporate performance is significantly negative. The results also show that poorly performing family CEOs are more likely to be dismissed than nonfamily CEOs. Hence, family firms are less likely to have any form of explicit CEO dismissal rule except when CEOs performance is poor. CEO ownership is not important in explaining family CEO tenure. Likewise, the effects of family control on CEO tenure are not due to board ownership. Our results imply that family CEOs already have sufficient motivation and thus there is less need for dismissal. Strong reciprocal involvement among family members is an effective form of economic organization.
From a theoretical perspective, long CEO tenures do not necessarily imply that corporate governance practices are flawed in family firms. The efficiency of corporate governance depends on organizational structures. We suggest that the agency theory is unsuitable for analyzing family firms. Although this study did not explicitly investigate monitoring mechanisms in family firms, the results have important implications for CEO tenure in family firms. For example, CEO ownership may affect tenure but its impact is not relevant in family firms. In fact, family CEOs can still effectively control a firm regardless of relatively low ownership. Board control may also influence CEO turnover. Monitoring effects are built in with family control, despite low board ownership. Although governance mechanisms in family firms are considerably different from those of nonfamily firms, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is identical in both. Family control seems to serve as a monitoring system that substitutes for CEO bonding. We have shown that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms but unsuitable for family firms.
